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Grand Visions in an Age of Conflict
introduction
Last spring Professor Laurence H. Tribe commented that federal
constitutional law is in a state of intellectual disarray: “[I]n area after area, we
find ourselves at a fork in the road—a point at which it’s fair to say things
could go in any of several directions” and we have “little common ground from
which to build agreement.”1 No doubt fortuitously, two of our most
formidable constitutional scholars, Akhil R. Amar and Jed Rubenfeld, have
recently published systematic studies that implicitly challenge Tribe’s
conclusion that “ours [is] a peculiarly bad time to be going out on a limb to
propound a Grand Unified Theory—or anything close.”2 With admirable
boldness, Professors Amar and Rubenfeld have done precisely that—gone out
on a limb, or rather two very different limbs, to propound their own accounts
of what American constitutionalism is, or should be. Amar’s America’s
Constitution and Rubenfeld’s Revolution by Judiciary are alike in that each is its
author’s synthesis of a remarkable effort, sustained over a number of years, to
develop a comprehensive vision of the Constitution. We have much to learn
from their successes as well as from the points at which they are, I believe, in
error.
i. amar’s constitution
A. The Constitution of Text and Structure
Readers familiar with the prolific work of Akhil Amar will find in America’s
Constitution a fitting capstone to two decades of erudite and wide-ranging

1.
2.

Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 291, 292 (2005).
Id. at 293 (emphasis omitted).
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scholarship. From his first major article, Of Sovereignty and Federalism
(published in 1987),3 Amar’s work has been characterized by an unusually close
attention to the text of the Constitution, to the structure of the instrument as a
document, and to the Federal Republic as a system of government. An intense
interest in history, backed up by exhaustive research, and an admirable
willingness to think outside the confines of what passes in constitutional law
for ordinary science have also been salient elements in the Amar oeuvre. His
lively mind and facile pen have made his work unavoidable for anyone
interested in constitutional law, including many aspects of the law of the
Constitution, such as criminal procedure, that are now treated by almost
everyone else as separate areas of research and writing.
America’s Constitution crystallizes both Amar’s general approach and his
substantive themes. He comments almost at the beginning that his goal is “to
reacquaint twenty-first-century Americans with the written Constitution”
rather than to contribute to the endless discussion of “legal dictums and
doctrines that appear nowhere in the Constitution itself.”4 Almost at the end of
the book’s text, he comments that he “ha[s] tried to give the reader facts and
figures—lots of them,”5 and he certainly cannot be faulted on either score.
America’s Constitution is not exactly a line by line review of the instrument’s
provisions, but I know of no other book in many years as comprehensive in its
treatment of all parts of the constitutional text. It is, furthermore, full of
historical information, some of it likely to surprise even the most informed
reader, and all of it arranged so as to lure the reader on rather than deter her.
Amar’s interest in structural matters bears fruit repeatedly in discussions of
the origins of constitutional language and of American governmental practice
that are of the greatest interest. I will not stop to give details, but Amar’s
treatment of the pervasive role of slavery in the Constitution of 1787, and (on
that topic and others) his industry in asking—and answering—questions about
the practical consequences of constitutional arrangements are excellent
examples of how fascinating his work can be.6 Furthermore, Amar’s zest for
this sort of fine-grained and imaginative consideration of structural
arrangements is infectious: When he remarks at the end that he thinks a “well-

3.
4.
5.
6.

96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987).
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY, at xi (2005).
Id. at 469.
For specific examples, see his discussion of the 1787 Constitution’s attribution to slave states
of representation based on a formula counting each slave as three-fifths of a free inhabitant,
id. at 88-98, his shrewd insight into the historical significance of the Necessary and Proper
Clause’s wording for separation of powers, id. at 110-13, and his observations about the
Twelfth Amendment, id at 149-52, 336-47.
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chosen number can be every bit as interesting as a well-chosen quote,”7 I
suspect that a great many readers will feel, as I did, that Amar chose well.
B. The Secondary Role of History
America’s Constitution is a learned and in some respects even a brilliant
book, but it is also deeply problematic. Perhaps the briefest way to identify my
concern is that I fear this is a book, and maybe an author, unsure of what the
subject under discussion really is. The result, I think, is that in too many places
the reader not caught up entirely by Professor Amar’s facts and figures may
find herself unable to say precisely what sort of conclusions Amar is offering
us.
The full title of Amar’s book is America’s Constitution: A Biography, and one
might expect the final noun to define, even if metaphorically, the book’s genre.
The 1787 text that we refer to as the (original) Constitution has a history in
several senses: It is a historical document and an enormous amount can and
has been said about its antecedents, the history of its drafting by the
Philadelphia Framers, and the debates and political maneuvering by which it
came to be accepted as the constitutive legal instrument of the American
Republic. Similar enquiries can be made about the later bits of text that
together with the 1787 document make up the Constitution to be found in
casebooks on federal constitutional law. It would make obvious if nonliteral
sense to term a historical study of some aspect of these matters “a biography.”
It would be clear the author’s claims were assertions of political history (i.e.,
this is how Alexander Hamilton and company turned a clear Anti-Federalist
majority into the losing side on the issue of ratification in New York) or
intellectual history (i.e., this is what Alexander Hamilton thought the term
“direct Taxes” meant). Amar gives us a considerable amount of detail about the
politics behind various constitutional provisions and the constitutional
opinions of various historical actors. Furthermore, in the last paragraph of the
book he claims that his goal has been “to understand precisely what the
document did and did not mean to those who enacted and amended it,”8
suggesting that he is indeed writing intellectual history. However, while it is
dangerous to reject a scholar’s own explanation of his methods and goals, I
believe that this statement is in reality erroneous: it is, as I shall argue, quite
contrary to Amar’s actual practices in justifying claims about constitutional

7.
8.

Id. at 469.
Id. at 477.
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meaning in America’s Constitution. Despite all its historical detail, political and
intellectual, America’s Constitution is not, in the end, a book of history.
Consider, as an example, the lengthy discussion of the Constitution’s
Preamble to which Amar devotes the first chapter of America’s Constitution. As
in many other chapters, Amar uses his focus on a particular constitutional
provision as the vehicle for a discussion of other, more broad-ranging themes.
Chapter one returns to questions Amar has thought about for many years: the
nature of the Union and the locus of sovereignty within that Union. Amar
quickly and correctly reminds the reader that debate over such matters loomed
large in the antebellum history of the United States. Hamiltonians and
Jeffersonians fought over the scope of congressional power, Webster and Story
squared off against the nullifiers, and Unionists and secessionists alike justified
the Civil War—all in terms of an interminable debate over whether the states
or the Union was originally sovereign, what the various events since
independence might have done to the original arrangements, and (finally)
whether individual states had the legal right to leave the Union.
There are many historical enquiries one can make into this history of
debate, but to be historical enquiries they must address issues about what the
individuals and groups involved meant or did, or about what the ordinary
person of the time would have thought about the matter (often a hard question
to answer with confidence, but not in its nature ahistorical). But Amar’s real
interest lies not in the history of antebellum opinion but in what he evidently
thinks of as the answer to a normative or legal question. Speaking in his own
voice, he tells us that “both before and after ratifying the Articles [of
Confederation], the people of each state—and not the people of America as a
whole—were sovereign”;9 “[a]lthough states would enter the Constitution as
true sovereigns, they would not remain so after [a] ratification” that “would
itself end each state’s sovereign status and would prohibit future unilateral
secession”;10 it is an error to claim “that none of the thirteen original states had
ever been truly sovereign.”11 Each of these assertions was entirely familiar to
antebellum constitutionalists. Thomas Jefferson and Jefferson Davis agreed
with the first and last while denying the second; John Jay and Abraham
Lincoln held the opposite view . . . and Professor Amar is willing to explain to
us where each was wrong and each right, and why.12

9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 26.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 39.
I mention Jay only because his discussion of the locus-of-sovereignty question in Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), which Amar never discusses on this issue, is an
especially clear statement of the nationalist position at a point in time immediately after
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It is rather fun to see a twenty-first-century scholar answer nineteenthcentury questions and chastise nineteenth-century statesmen, but if this were
meant to be history, the attempt to do so would be a category error: The views
of historical figures on a question of constitutional interpretation in dispute
among them cannot be right or wrong when the question at hand is what the
historical meaning of the document was. They are witnesses to the question of
historical meaning, whereas the issue of who was right and who wrong is a
normative matter of law or politics or morality. Unless one adopts a strongly
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation, the attempt to adjudicate
between the opinions held by these historical figures mixes intellectual apples
and oranges. The difficulty is not ameliorated even if we shift our attention to
what Amar later calls “the meaning inherent in the basic acts of constitution.”13
It is true that President Lincoln thought (and Professor Amar believes) that the
inherent meaning of the ratification process of 1787-1788 entailed the merger of
the states’ individual sovereignties into an indivisible nation, but President
Jefferson and many others have thought that inherent meaning was quite the
opposite.14 Once again, history cannot prove the correct answer to the
normative question either way, and assertions about the normative answer are
not history.
I slipped in a qualification in the middle of the preceding paragraph. It is
perfectly sensible to argue, for example, that the historical evidence shows that
most Founding-era Americans thought Jefferson wrong and the antebellum
nationalists right on the locus of sovereignty after ratification—though I
personally doubt that the evidence can be marshaled either way. If one
stipulates a strictly originalist view of constitutional interpretation (one
formulation: the normative meaning of a constitutional provision is that which
most competent interpreters would have thought it meant when it was made
law15), then a convincing historical argument on that question of intellectual

13.
14.

15.

ratification. While Amar makes little use of Supreme Court opinions, it is striking that he
ignores Jay while quoting John Marshall’s opinion in the much later case of Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
AMAR, supra note 4, at 470.
While the question of secession is, I assume, permanently off the table, one need only read
Justice Clarence Thomas’s opinion for four justices in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514
U.S. 779, 845 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting), to see that Jefferson’s understanding of 17871788 as leaving the states’ individual sovereignties intact at a basic level is alive and well.
There have been many attempts to fine-tune a definition of constitutional originalism. I am
employing the one that seems to me the most plausible, but resolving this definitional
matter is irrelevant for present purposes for, as stated in the text, Professor Amar is not a
strict originalist.
I am indebted to my friend and colleague Walter Dellinger for the adjective. Dellinger
has long argued that the existence of a written Constitution necessarily makes a moderate
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history would answer the normative question of constitutional meaning as
well.
Professor Amar, however, is clearly not a strict originalist. Proofs of this in
America’s Constitution are legion: The Commerce Clause, for example, may
provide a constitutional basis for federal regulation of “all forms of intercourse
in the affairs of life, whether or not narrowly economic . . . if a given problem
genuinely spill[s] across state or national lines”;16 Article V may not be the
exclusive means of amending the Constitution;17 and there may be Ninth
Amendment rights that “might not be inferable from the Constitution’s text
and structure but that nevertheless might deserve constitutional status.”18
Amar cannot explain the use of history and law in America’s Constitution on
strict-originalist grounds because he does not practice that approach to
constitutional interpretation.
Professor Amar’s conclusions about sovereignty are not historical
assertions, nor are they propositions of strict-originalist constitutional law.
Still less are they presented as interpretations of standard legal doctrine, the
usual grist for constitutional mills but an enterprise that (as we have seen)
Amar expressly puts to one side in America’s Constitution. In form and logic,
they bear little resemblance to the sorts of empirical, economic, and
institutional enquiries that interest most contemporary political scientists.
Here, as at many other points in the book, Amar’s answers to what “the
Constitution” means simply do not speak to the sorts of questions historians,
lawyers, and political scientists raise. So exactly what kind of answers is
Professor Amar giving us—and to what questions?19

16.
17.

18.
19.

originalism an indispensable starting point for anything that can plausibly claim to be
American constitutional law: A refusal to use original meaning to establish the starting point
for the words the document uses would render the text infinitely manipulable. Dellinger,
Amar, and I are all moderate originalists in this sense.
AMAR, supra note 4, at 107-08.
Id. at 295-99. Amar cites only James Wilson from the Founding era as possibly supporting
this idea, and his earlier scholarship to the same effect points to little else relevant to an
originalist. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994). Here, as elsewhere when he diverges
radically from the more usual views, in America’s Constitution Amar tends to avoid direct
statements and to present his argument as a matter of interpretive possibility: “shouldn’t
Article V . . . be read as nonexclusive?” AMAR, supra note 4, at 297. My point is that Amar
has no a priori objection to accepting as correct constitutional arguments that cannot be
defended on strict-originalist grounds.
AMAR, supra note 4, at 328.
Just to be clear: I am not criticizing Amar in the least for his decision not to load the text
down with “quibbling qualifiers.” AMAR, supra note 4, at 470. He is quite clear from the
beginning that America’s Constitution is “an opinionated biography.” Id. at xii. The problem
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C. The Textualism of Real Meaning
The answer to our conundrum, according to Professor Amar himself, is
that he is “a constitutional textualist”20: He is not, therefore, so much
interested in what any individual, whether founder or twenty-first-century
American, thought or thinks about the meaning of the written Constitution,
but rather in what the Constitution means in itself. At the beginning of his
discussion of the questions of national unity and state sovereignty, Amar
comments that “[i]n word and deed, the Constitution yielded its own answers
to these epic questions.”21 What Amar seeks to explain, then, is the
Constitution’s own resolution of the issues that divided Hamilton and
Jefferson, Lincoln and Davis. His license to adjudicate between these historical
figures—to tell us when Lincoln was right and Davis wrong—stems from the
Constitution itself, which has its own intrinsic meaning that is quite distinct
from the views of even its most distinguished makers and interpreters. From
this perspective, furthermore, concerned as it is with the written Constitution
rather than with matters that “appear nowhere in the Constitution itself,”22
issues such as whether most people in 1788 or 1868 would have agreed with
Amar’s conclusions are secondary.
Amar is not, of course, a narrow literalist–recall his invocation of “the
meaning inherent in the basic acts of constitution.”23 He writes: “I myself do
not believe that all of American constitutionalism can be deduced simply from
the document.”24 A sophisticated textualism of the sort he intends to employ
must take account of “both constitutional politics (how did the text come to be
enacted?) and constitutional law (what did the enacted text mean?).”25 To do
so fully, Amar believes, requires one to transgress the disciplinary boundaries
that, he rather clearly thinks, handicap the work of most other scholars. “Law,
history, and political science–these three disciplines form the legs of the stool
on which this book rests.”26 Amar’s ambition is “to synthesize” these three
disciplines in writing his account of the Constitution since “each discipline in

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

with the locus-of-sovereignty discussion in chapter one, a problem that I believe appears
recurrently in America’s Constitution, is that it is unclear what Amar is giving his opinions
about.
Id. at 470.
Id. at 21.
Id. at xi.
Id. at 470.
Id. at 477.
Id. at 469.
Id. at 467.
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isolation may be faulted”27: The lawyer’s attention to the logic and normative
implications of the text’s provisions, the historian’s knowledge of the conflicts
that shaped the text, and the political scientist’s interest in how political
structures interact are all necessary if we are to understand in an appropriately
sophisticated way the meaning of the written Constitution.
Amar is not, furthermore, an exegete of isolated clauses. Despite his
deliberate focus at many points on the meaning of particular constitutional
terms, Amar’s practice of constitutional textualism is an enquiry into the
meaning of the Constitution–including all of its amendments–as an integrated
and coherent whole. Amar’s textualism is not a clause-bound interpretivism
but a broad enquiry into how the “various provisions . . . intermesh to form
larger patterns of meaning and structures of decision making.”28 Amar
sometimes refers to “the larger pattern”29 evidenced by distinct provisions and
the “general . . . vision inform[ing] much” of the Constitution’s “overall
structure and many of its specific words.”30 He is intensely interested in what
he sees as the “multiple textual harmonies at play”31 among different
provisions–including provisions written and adopted at different times–and in
the “keys and cues” to be found in the details of “the Founding act and text,”32
which, in his judgment, reveal the underlying meaning of the Constitution
viewed as a unified whole. The underlying assumption in all this, of course, is
that the Constitution in fact has a coherent overall meaning, and that its
individual provisions, including provisions enacted at widely separated points
in time, can be put side by side to yield meanings that separately they would
not have. But this is the theory: How does Amar’s textualism work in practice?
Before answering that question, I need to be clear about a few matters over
which Professor Amar and I have no dispute. No one doubts that specific
constitutional arrangements (the structuring of the legislative process in Article
I, for example) were intended to produce coherent, or at least workable,
governmental procedures.33 It makes good historical sense to attempt to
discern how the makers of a particular constitutional arrangement meant it to
work, it is worthy political science to examine how the Constitution’s

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 466-67.
Id. at xii.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 326.
Id. at 472 n.*.
Equally, however, no one believes that the Constitution’s various makers always succeeded
in doing so—no one including Professor Amar. His unhappiness with the Article V
amendment process is especially striking.
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governmental procedures work and have worked in practice, and it is one of
the lawyer’s quintessential tasks to harmonize clashing or discordant
provisions in a binding legal instrument. But Professor Amar’s theoretical
“aspiration [is] to holism . . . to unite law, history, and political science [and]
to view the document over its entire life span.”34 His disciplinary tools are
meant to serve a task–the search for the actual meaning of the Constitution–
that transcends them all. As I shall suggest, this search leads to less obvious,
and less obviously correct, results than one might expect. I have space to deal at
length with only one example.
Amar criticizes “modern observers” for slighting “the significance of
geographic/geostrategic considerations that loomed large in the Federalist
vision”35 and regards America’s Constitution as a creative and even novel
correction to this error. The implicit but unmistakable claim to novelty is
overstated: It is hard to imagine that many scholars would disagree with the
proposition that the Founders were concerned about creating a federal
government capable of addressing the foreign policy and national security
needs of the Republic.36 However, it is certainly the case that important aspects
of Professor Amar’s presentation of this commonplace are original. In his view,
for example, the Founders’ “geostrategic vision of union [was] distilled in the
Preamble,”37 by which he means that the Preamble’s words reveal that the
Constitution as a whole has as its inherent purpose the creation of “an island
nation . . . where foreign powers would be far removed and where internal
borders would be demilitarized.”38 This is a singular assertion: There is, as far
as America’s Constitution shows or I am aware, no evidence that anyone in the
Founding era thought that the Preamble did any such thing other than in the
general and almost trivial sense that it was a statement of the Constitution’s
goals.
There is a similar problem with Professor Amar’s “distinctive claim[]” that
the Preamble’s “proper place [was] the Founders’ foundation” and that other

34.
35.
36.

37.
38.

Id. at 469.
Id. at 472-73.
In fact, the scholarly literature is full of attention to the role of what Amar terms
“geostrategy” in the making and early interpretation of the Constitution. For a provocative
recent example, see Robert J. Delahunty, Structuralism and the War Powers: The Army, Navy
and Militia Clauses, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1021 (2003). Our overall understanding of the role
such considerations play in the making of a constitutional order has been enormously
enriched by PHILIP BOBBIT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF
HISTORY (2002). Professor Amar mentions the work of neither Delahunty nor Bobbitt.
AMAR, supra note 4, at 106.
Id. at 44.
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scholars have ignored this fact.39 The claim is distinctive but unpersuasive. The
Preamble’s language was cast in the common idiom of American political
discourse and in many respects (“Justice . . . common defense . . . general
Welfare”) that of all Western political discourse. On occasion, to be sure,
constitutionalists and politicians have quoted its particular phrases but the
scarcity of such usages is unsurprising: The common law treated preambular
material in a legal instrument as without direct legal force, and for that and
other reasons the Preamble has understandably played little role in discussion
of a document universally treated as law.40 Amar’s claim that the particular use
of this language in the Preamble was of great importance historically, or that it
sheds much light on the legal interpretation of the rest of the Constitution or
on the institutional dynamics of our political system is, at best, unproven in
America’s Constitution.
Given Professor Amar’s frequent stress on the importance of verbal
parallels, it is appropriate to examine a specific instance of the manner in which
he attempts to use such parallels to show the importance of the Preamble. We
are told that Article I, Section 8 begins with words that show that the
Preamble’s “geostrategic vision” informs the Constitution’s grant of powers to
Congress: “section 8 began by echoing the Preamble almost verbatim, in
language affirming the need to ‘Provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare.’”41 The “echo” is, however, no more exact than the “[s]imilar
phraseology” which, as Amar properly acknowledges at once, is found in
Article VIII of the Articles of Confederation. Indeed, the language of section 8
(“provide for the common Defence and general Welfare”) seems to me closer
as a verbal matter to that of the Articles (“incurred for the common defense or
general welfare”) than it is to that of the Preamble, which breaks the two nouns
into separate infinitive phrases. Why then doesn’t Section 8 show that it

39.
40.

41.

Id. at 471.
In 1791, the first Federal Attorney General, Edmund Randolph, rejected reliance on the
Preamble in constitutional argument in advising President Washington that the national
bank bill was invalid:
“The Preamble to the Constitution has also been relied on as a source of power.
To this, it will be here remarked, once for all, that the Preamble if it be operative
is a full constitution of itself, and the body of the Constitution is useless; but that
it is declarative only of the views of the convention, which they supposed would
be best fulfilled by the powers delineated; and that such is the legitimate nature of
preambles.”
Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, The Constitutionality of the Bank Bill: The Attorney
General’s First Constitutional Law Opinions, 44 DUKE L.J. 110, 125 (1994) (quoting Randolph’s
unpublished opinion).
AMAR, supra note 4, at 106.
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embodies the geostrategic vision distilled in the Articles, the language of which
it echoes almost verbatim? The answer, one fears, is that America’s Constitution
posits a sharp contrast between the Articles and the Constitution in this and
other matters, and that the inconvenient parallel in word choice between
Section 8 and the Articles does not serve to advance this contrast. I agree
entirely with any reader inclined to dismiss all of this as insignificant verbal
quibbling—but Professor Amar cannot rightly do so because he puts great
weight on such “textual harmonies.”
If this were an isolated example of how Amar’s textualism works, one
might properly set it aside as a slip, but the passage is, I believe, exemplary of
how his textualism often plays out in practice. I will give a few other examples
briefly, but to gauge the fairness of my criticism the reader must read America’s
Constitution itself. Professor Amar assures us that the Constitution rests on “a
clear commitment to people over property.” Perhaps, but the observation that
the expression “private property” never appears in the 1787 document and that
the noun’s only occurrence refers to government property42 does little to
advance the claim; slavery, the importance of which to the 1787 Constitution
Amar details at length, never appears as a verbal matter either. Although Article
I “borrow[ed] the name of confederate America’s central organ—‘Congress’—it
promised a quite different institution,” in part (we are told) by expressly
granting to the constitutional Congress “legislative Powers” and referring to its
power to make “Laws”;43 true enough about the Constitution’s terminology,
but the second provision of the Articles referred to “every power, jurisdiction,
and right . . . delegated to” the Confederation Congress, and that body
designated its own enactments as “ordinances.” Do the verbal differences mean
that much?44 That the Second, Fourth, and Seventh Amendments “aimed to
protect popular rights [as opposed to sheerly individual ones] via institutions
(the militia and the jury) that would embody ‘the people’ themselves” is
indicated, Amar believes, by the occurrence of “security” in the Second,
“secure” in the Fourth, and “securities” in an early draft of the Seventh

42.
43.
44.

Id. at 17.
Id. at 57.
The first definition of “ordinance” in Dr. Johnson’s dictionary is “Law, rule, precept.” The
Federalist describes the enactments of the Confederation Congress as “laws” and asserts, in
the course of minimizing the difference between that body and the legislature proposed by
the 1787 instrument, that the old Congress “have as compleat authority” as the new
Congress would to make its pronouncements legally binding. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO.
21 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 37, 45 (James Madison). The point is not that Amar is wrong
to see a significant difference between the two bodies, but rather that his verbal
observations, here as elsewhere, often do little to advance his conclusions.
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Amendment.45 America’s Constitution abounds in this type of ingenious but
unconvincing exegesis of the Constitution’s wording.46
D. An Underlying Problem of Method?
When an eminent constitutionalist writes that the 1787 document’s concern
with protecting the territorial integrity of the United States “informed . . . its
pointed Article VI language describing the Constitution as the law of ‘the
Land’”,47 it is clear that something has gone wrong. How could such a learned
and industrious scholar make such a claim, or the other, similarly remarkable
assertions that abound in America’s Constitution? I believe that at least part of
the answer lies in Professor Amar’s desire to craft a new and more sophisticated
textualism employing the three disciplines of history, law, and political science.
His goal, of course, is to reach a richer understanding of the text by melding
these disciplines. All too often, unfortunately, the result is that his textualism
escapes the constraints of all three, and Amar offers us readings of the text that
are indefensible as history, law, or political science.
As a historical matter, the Supremacy Clause of Article VI was obviously
using the familiar language of the Magna Carta. No competent lawyer would
argue in a brief or opinion that the reference to “the land” in the clause sheds
any light on the powers or responsibilities of the federal government (and
certainly not any reference to protecting the territorial jurisdiction of the
Republic), and a political scientist would be interested in the role of federal law

45.

46.

47.

AMAR, supra note 4, at 326-27. Professor Amar points out, fairly enough, that the Second and
Fourth Amendments refer to “the right of the people” and that Madison’s draft of what
became the Seventh has the same expression with “rights” in the plural. The problem—
besides the odd reliance on a draft that was very substantially modified before it was
proposed and adopted—is, as with his use of the Preamble, that these phrases are the
common coin of Founding-era political discussion. Without more, their use proves only the
truism that the Bill of Rights is cast in the language of the era that created it. The use of
words at various points with the common root “secure” is, I think, of no interpretive
significance whatever.
Attorney General Randolph, whom I quoted earlier, pointed out in 1791 the ironic error in
putting this sort of weight on the precise wording of the constitutional text:
“Whosoever will attentively inspect the Constitution will readily perceive the
force of what is expressed in the letter of the convention, ‘That the Constitution
was the result of a spirit of amity and mutual deference & concession.’ To argue,
then, from its style or arrangement, as being logically exact, is perhaps a scheme
of reasoning not absolutely precise.”
Dellinger & Powell, supra note 40, at 128 (quoting Randolph’s unpublished opinion). Overprecision in constitutional textualism, in other words, can lead to lead to legal imprecision!
AMAR, supra note 4, at 51.
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supremacy in enabling the Republic to safeguard the interests of the whole, not
in what amounts to a pun. Other than as a joke—which he plainly does not
intend it to be—Amar’s reference to the language of the Supremacy Clause fits
into no obvious area of discourse.
America’s Constitution would have been a more persuasive book if Amar had
actually written the work that his words occasionally suggest—an encyclopedic
examination of the text’s original meaning informed by his deep interest in
institutional dynamics. But that would have been merely to write history, and
Amar’s deep ambition goes beyond history or law or political science. The 1787
document, as he so often reminds the reader, begins with the words “We the
People,” and Amar the textualist takes that bit of text with alarming
seriousness. In America’s Constitution, the real story is not his often illuminating
discussions of the political struggles that lay behind the various provisions,
enacted at various times, which we collectively refer to as the Constitution. It is
instead the story of a text that has a unity transcending the limits of history and
chronology,48 a story in which the real actor, the actual creator of the
Constitution, is a People whose identity is not bound by time.49 It is an
imaginative story, told well, but the reader should take it cum grano salis.
ii. rubenfeld’s revolution
A. The Form of the Argument
In 1989 a young lawyer then in private practice published a remarkable
article entitled The Right of Privacy.50 Roe v. Wade has had many defenders, but
those who are academic lawyers have often acted as such with an uneasy
conscience, fearing that the great John Hart Ely was right in rejecting the
decision as one that “is not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an
obligation to try to be.”51 Indeed it is arguable, as Ely himself feared, that the

48.

49.

50.
51.

Professor Amar’s search for echoes and harmonies in the language of constitutional
provisions ranges forward and backward in time: He is as critical of “historians of the
Founding” for “often fail[ing] to show much interest in the intense secession debate that
occurred many decades later,” as he is of “Civil War historians [who] are not always fluent
in the facts of the Founding.” Id. at 472 n.*.
See, e.g., id. at 10 (“The people had taken center stage and enacted their own supreme law”
in 1788); id. at 468 (“We the People eventually abolished slavery and promised equal rights
to blacks and, later, women”).
Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989).
John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 947
(1973).
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desperate wish to protect the outcome in Roe has led many of its proponents
essentially to abandon the effort to distinguish constitutional decisions by the
Supreme Court from political decisionmaking by Congress or the state
legislatures.52 Jed Rubenfeld, on the other hand, made it clear in 1989, once
and for all, that he will have none of that. The Court got the law of the
Constitution right in Roe in his view, and for that reason—and only so—the
Court should adhere to the decision. Rubenfeld’s article was the single most
sustained and powerful legal justification for Roe that had ever been written,
and his work since then has combined a forthright adherence as a general
matter to the Court’s “liberal” decisions with an unrelenting insistence that
judicial review is legitimate only as the exercise of the power to interpret and
apply law and not as a simple form of political choice. In Revolution by Judiciary,
Rubenfeld has given us his clearest account to date of how the Court ought to
decide constitutional cases, and how in doing so it is interpreting the
Constitution rather than imposing the political preferences of the Justices.
Revolution by Judiciary divides into three parts of roughly the same length.
The third and final section is an incisive critique of the Rehnquist Court’s
constitutional legacy, which Rubenfeld identifies as the pursuit of an
unacknowledged and indefensible agenda of opposition to the antidiscrimination principles that the Court and Congress appropriately enforced
in the past.53 Important and interesting as his arguments on that score are,54 I
believe that Rubenfeld’s fundamental contribution to constitutional law lies in
the discussion, mostly though not entirely in the book’s first section, of how
constitutional decisions are and ought to be reached. In this Commentary I
shall focus my attention on that discussion, although I shall conclude my
consideration of Revolution by Judiciary with some comments on the arguments
in the second section of Rubenfeld’s book, which offers a theory of why
constitutional law has normative force.
B. The Missing Law of Constitutional Interpretation
There are two background presuppositions to the argument of Revolution
by Judiciary. The first is that the history of constitutional law is one of “radical

52.
53.
54.

See John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where
Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833 (1991).
JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 175-83 (2005).
Among many possible examples, see his excellent, sharply critical discussion of the Court’s
adoption of strict scrutiny as the proper form of review for race-based affirmative action. Id.
at 195-201.
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judicial reinterpretation” of the Constitution: the repeated episodes in which
the Supreme Court has rejected established understandings of the Constitution
and replaced them with novel principles and conclusions of its own devising.55
The Court and its defenders often explain such radical reinterpretation with a
“rhetoric of restoration” (what seems novel is in fact the recovery of an earlier
constitutional vision that has been lost) or the claim that all that has changed
are the circumstances of decision and not the constitutional principles the
Court employs. In Professor Rubenfeld’s opinion these are charades that serve
only to obscure the truth that in such situations the Court is “creat[ing] . . .
genuinely innovative constitutional law—decisions that break profoundly from
both past understandings and present doctrines.”56 Brown v. Board of Education
didn’t recover the lost truth about the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause:
It introduced a new and creative understanding of equal protection into
American constitutional law.
Rubenfeld’s second presupposition is that American constitutional law “has
no account of radical reinterpretation.” He asks, “What, if anything, makes it
legitimate for judges to re-read the Constitution radically . . . . What, if
anything, guides or structures this power? What, if anything, limits it?”57 Even
worse, if possible, lawyers and scholars cannot explain how judges are to go
about making constitutional decisions even when they intend no revolutionary
change. “There is no law of constitutional interpretation”; constitutional law
thus “has nearly nothing to say about the connection between the Constitution
and the enormous web of doctrine spun judicially around that document.”58
This poses no problem, to be sure, for a self-proclaimed pragmatist like Judge
Richard Posner who sees constitutional “law” as the creation of outcomes “well
adapted to the country’s needs” without regard to any duty to “‘abide by
constitutional or statutory text.’”59 One takes the Posnerian route, however,
only by giving up on the traditional understanding that constitutional law is

55.

56.

57.
58.
59.

“Radical reinterpretation is, precisely, a new interpretation of the basic principles or
purposes behind a constitutional provision. Through this act of reinterpretation, new
constitutional purposes or principles replace the original ones.” Id. at 9.
Id. at 8-9. “Constitutional law has utterly rejected originalism” as the limiting criterion for
judicial decisionmaking. Id. at 65. I will note below the sense in which one could view
Rubenfeld as a kind of originalist.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 10. Rubenfeld is quoting Judge Posner’s denial of the existence of such a duty in
Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 737, 739 (2002), surely one of the most remarkable statements ever to be made by a
sitting federal judge. Rubenfeld’s response to Posner is, I believe, utterly convincing. See Jed
Rubenfeld, A Reply to Posner, 54 STAN. L. REV. 753, 767 (2002).
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authoritative precisely because the judges who make it see their “first duty” to
be “to abide by the Constitution: to deliver a just reading of that document
according to interpretive criteria.”60 Pragmatism in Judge Posner’s sense is
simply the abandonment of law altogether, and that Rubenfeld is unwilling to
do.
Fortunately for those of us less intrepid than Judge Posner, according to
Revolution by Judiciary we have no need to give up on constitutional law as law
in the sense I have just quoted. Despite the existence of radical change in
constitutional law, and the nonexistence of a shared explicit understanding
about how to do constitutional law properly, “[t]he extraordinary fact” is that
virtually all of constitutional law—including almost all the many instances in
which the disparate and often political “approaches, motives, and biases” of the
justices have been on display—has been worked out “within a determinate
interpretive structure.”61 Although neither the courts nor anyone else has been
consciously working within that structure, Rubenfeld believes that he can
show the existence of an internal logic to constitutional decisionmaking, one
that is continuously at work both in decisions about the Constitution’s grants
of power and in ones concerning individual rights. The first part of the book is
a summary and restatement of the work Rubenfeld has long been doing in
uncovering and explaining what his subtitle calls “the structure of American
constitutional law.”
C. Does Constitutional Law Have an Implicit Logic?
The key to understanding the implicit logic of constitutional law lies in
what Professor Rubenfeld calls the “impossibly simple distinction”62 between
the historical understanding of what a constitutional provision addresses and
historical understandings about those matters that the provision does not
address.
Let us say, as a shorthand, that a prohibitory [provision] applies to
those actions it prohibits, and that it does not apply to those actions it
does not prohibit. So I will call specific understandings of what a
constitutional right prohibits Application Understandings, and of what it
does not prohibit, No-Application Understandings. . . .
Similarly, with respect to constitutional power-granting provisions
(such as the commerce clause), which authorize certain actors to take

60.
61.
62.

RUBENFELD, supra note 53, at 10.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 13.
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certain actions, I [distinguish] specific understandings of what such a
provision authorizes [from] specific understandings of what such a
provision does not authorize.63
Rubenfeld’s strong claim is that constitutional law has almost invariably
respected the historical understanding of those issues to which a constitutional
provision applies—the specific actions the Free Speech Clause historically was
thought to forbid or the specific regulations the Commerce Clause historically
was thought to authorize. With respect to historical understandings about the
concerns a provision addresses, even the most radical judicial reinterpretations
have preserved the historical understanding of the text’s applications.
Furthermore, the “foundational or core applications”64 of a provision—its central
or most universally shared “Application Understandings”—have acted not only
to anchor radical reinterpretation in a faithfulness to the text, but also to “serve
as paradigm cases [that] provide the reference points for the construction of
doctrinal frameworks.”65 In other words, judges use the historical
understanding about the issues a provision addresses to ground their reasoning
in applying the provision to specific controversies. These paradigm cases thus
define the conceptual universe within which constitutional law is debated and
made. “The foundational paradigm cases are preinterpretive. They precede
interpretation; they define its limits and its objects.”66
But how then does one explain the demonstrable fact that the Supreme
Court has again and again declared a principle to be the law of the Constitution
when the makers and early interpreters of the provision in question would have
been astounded—or shocked—to hear as much? Rubenfeld’s answer is that
while the Court has almost always observed Application Understandings, it has
felt entirely free to reject other historical understandings addressing matters as
to which the provision was originally thought to have no application. The Free
Speech Clause was historically understood to prohibit government censorship
and prosecutions for seditious libel, and as Application Understandings those
twin prohibitions are the paradigm cases which subsequent free speech
doctrine has respected and revolved around. In contrast, the Free Speech
Clause was not historically thought to apply to prosecutions for blasphemy,

63.

64.
65.
66.

Id. at 14. The matter is complicated by the fact that a provision that is a grant of exclusive
power to, say, Congress, has a prohibitory function as well: It forbids other actors such as
the President from wielding what is put exclusively within Congress’s sphere. Rubenfeld
carefully works out this point. Id. at 48-49.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 132.
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but the Court long ago repudiated that No Application Understanding as a
guide to the proper interpretation of the First Amendment.67 In a parallel
fashion, Commerce Clause doctrine has maintained its fidelity to the paradigm
cases of what the clause was historically understood to authorize Congress to
do, while the Court has repeatedly upheld exercises of the Commerce Clause to
regulate matters to which the founders would not have thought it applicable.68
Grasping the fact that constitutional law treats only understandings about a
provision’s applications, not expectations about what it would not apply to, as
the controlling paradigm case(s) is the key to understanding the remarkable
combination of deep continuity and profound change that according to
Rubenfeld is the “characteristic mark of American constitutional
interpretation.”69 The Court has not hesitated to reach decisions “at odds with
original No-Application Understandings,”70 while even the most radical
reinterpretations have “labor[ed] under the continuing obligation to do justice
to the paradigm cases—or, more precisely, to do justice to the text in light of its
paradigm cases.”71 It therefore would be possible to call Rubenfeld’s theory a
form of originalism, for he insists that what renders constitutional law a
coherent and workable form of law, an interpretation of the text of the
Constitution and not an untethered exercise of power by unelected judicial
politicians, is this obligation to build judicial doctrine and decision around
historically determined paradigm cases. But those who usually call themselves
originalists go further and insist that the Court is obliged to follow original
understandings about what constitutional provisions do not address (No
Application Understandings) as well—a practice that the Court has never
followed and that, if one truly accepted it, would render most of modern
constitutional law both erroneous and unintelligible.72 Rubenfeld, true

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 25-29.
Id. at 53-56.
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id. at 17.
“What the originalists fail to see is that [the Court’s] selective treatment of historical
meaning is neither arbitrary nor unusual. It is part of the basic structure of American
constitutional law.” Id. at 31.
Professor Rubenfeld’s position is further distinguished from that usually thought of as
originalism in that he believes that under certain circumstances a new understanding of a
provision’s applications, one not actually entertained when the provision was adopted, can
become “a ‘fixed star’ or reference point by which future interpretations are measured.” Id.
at 122. In short, a new paradigm case. He points as examples to the processes by which the
Sedition Act of 1798 became a paradigm case of what the First Amendment prohibits and by
which Brown v. Board of Education became a paradigm case of what equal protection
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conservative that he is, declines to follow would-be originalists into this
interpretive radicalism.
If Rubenfeld’s description of the paradigm-case method of constitutional
interpretation is persuasive, it thus solves at one and the same time the
intellectual puzzles created by the existence of radical reinterpretation and the
absence of a law of constitutional interpretation. Radical reinterpretation
respects the true paradigm cases while treating freely other historical
understandings; the Court has followed this pattern of decision with great
fidelity and it is only now in a time of great intellectual disarray (I go beyond
Rubenfeld’s words) that Rubenfeld’s articulation of our law’s implicit logic has
become necessary. And it does so without discarding law as interpretation
altogether (Judge Posner) or delegitimizing the history of judicial
decisionmaking since the founding (the originalists).
D. The Success of the Paradigm-Case Method
This claim is so bold as to be breathtaking, but has Professor Rubenfeld
pulled it off? In my opinion, the answer is, bluntly, yes. The reader can
properly reach her own judgment only by going through Part I of Revolution by
Judiciary herself, but let me indicate why I think Rubenfeld has made good on
his claim. First, while one could quibble about details and Revolution by
Judiciary does not attempt a comprehensive examination of constitutional law
issues, I believe that Rubenfeld is justified in his historical assertion that the
Court has seldom if ever rejected what Rubenfeld calls the paradigm case(s)
informing a provision of the text. The endless examples one can give of the
Court clearly reaching results contrary to the expectations and intentions of the
text’s makers will turn out, almost invariably, to concern No Application
Understandings; in other words, the discarded historical understanding
concerned an issue to which the right or the grant of power was not thought to
apply. Merely to have observed this apparent pattern in our constitutional law
is a stunning achievement, and even those who reject Rubenfeld’s overall
argument are obligated to see the observation as one that they must recognize

requires. Id. at 122-23. Rubenfeld’s view of such after-the-fact understandings is carefully
nuanced: “[S]ubsequently developed Application Understandings . . . have a status close to
that of a foundational paradigm case,” but not identical, and “[n]one of them is beyond the
Court’s power to undo, but the Court would be under an obligation to demonstrate
compelling justifications for doing so.” Id. at 123.
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and deal with in offering their own accounts of constitutional
decisionmaking.73
A second reason for my belief that Rubenfeld has succeeded is that his
description of constitutional law as reasoning from the text’s paradigm cases
addresses constitutional law as the Justices and others have actually practiced
it; his method, if not his terminology, is recognizable as a description of the
type of basically common law reasoning that American lawyers and judges have
employed in interpreting the Constitution since the founding.74 In his
conclusion, Rubenfeld remarks that “[t]he purpose of constitutional theory is,
and always has been, to hold the mirror up to constitutional law,” while
immediately conceding that any theory will to some degree distort its subject.75
That has to be correct, at least if the term “constitutional theory” is to denote
any real connection to the constitutional law that goes on in the courts. A
besetting problem in much highly ambitious constitutional scholarship is its
remoteness from the practice of constitutional law, and in particular the
impossibility of imagining anyone other than the scholar himself being able to

73.

74.

75.

Professor Rubenfeld admits the possibility of two counter-examples: the Contracts Clause,
as to which the Court’s 1934 decision in Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 90 U.S. 398
(1934), arguably upheld a clear example of the sort of law prohibited by the clause’s
paradigm case; and the use of military force by the President in the absence of a
congressional declaration of war. As to Blaisdell, Rubenfeld suggests that if the decision did
in fact violate the Contract Clause’s paradigm case the Court should overrule it; with respect
to the Declare War Clause, he asserts that “American courts have never officially retreated
from the principle that the President may not unilaterally declare war.” RUBENFELD, supra
note 53, at 67-68. Well, no they haven’t—although that formulation of the constitutional
issue is, I think, uncharacteristically imprecise and misses the point made by some scholars
(me included) that there is a plausible or even persuasive original understanding that the
President may make unilateral use of military force in some situations and that the courts
have not erred in failing to rule otherwise. But if my doubts about Rubenfeld’s brief
discussion are justified, it only supports his historical claim that the paradigm case theory
explains the patterns of continuity and change by eliminating one of the two counterexamples.
In addition to the historical claim that he has identified what in fact the Court has been
doing for the past two centuries, Professor Rubenfeld properly notes that his account of
constitutional law reasoning systematizes the old common law approach to the
interpretation of a normative instrument. He is also aware, of course, of the important work
of other distinguished constitutional lawyers who hold somewhat similar views of
constitutional law. See RUBENFELD, supra note 53, at 205 n.1 (citing the work of Philip
Bobbitt and Richard H. Fallon, Jr.); see also H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 74-86 (1993) (arguing that traditional common lawyers
looked to the concrete details of past controversies in interpreting the meaning of legal
rules). “For classical common lawyers, rules were discovered in, debated in terms of, and
decided with reference to stories of past situations and decisions.” POWELL, supra, at 78.
RUBENFELD, supra note 53, at 201.
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employ the tools supposedly on offer. (How would one know what counts as a
textual harmony and what is a mere chance parallel in terminology?) Part I
(and Part III as well) of Revolution by Judiciary are strongly marked by
Rubenfeld’s keen interest in showing, both by reflection and by example, the
specifically legal character of constitutional interpretation.
I also think that Rubenfeld has rebutted the major criticisms of his legal
argument that have been or might be made. A critic, first, might worry that the
problem with Rubenfeld’s paradigm-case account of constitutional law is not
that it distorts the history or the legal character of constitutional law but that it
fails to shed much light on how constitutional law ought to be done. If this is
so, the account fails to address the questions raised by what Rubenfeld
identifies as the presuppositions of Revolution by Judiciary.76 As he himself
readily admits, to identify constitutional law with reasoning on the basis of
paradigm cases does not transform the enterprise into a deductive science.
Paradigm cases do not dictate unique answers to most constitutional
questions. Different judges will see the paradigm cases differently; it
will almost always be possible to capture the paradigmatic applications
of a particular constitutional right or power within more than one
interpretive paradigm. This means that five justices of the Supreme
Court can, at any given moment, redetermine the basic meaning of the
paradigm cases.77
Second, and still more fundamentally, our critic might observe, there can
be disagreement over what paradigm case is embodied in a constitutional
provision—and even whether there was any foundational or core Application
Understanding at all.78 Third and finally, the fact that there can be good-faith
disagreement over the nature and implications of the paradigm cases means

76.

77.
78.

My colleague Erwin Chemerinsky advanced this concern in his review of an earlier version
of Rubenfeld’s account of the paradigm-case method. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Grand
Theory of Constitutional Law?, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1249, 1261-62 (2002) (reviewing JED
RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
(2001)). For the reasons stated in the text, I think that Revolution by Judiciary provides a
satisfactory answer to Professor Chemerinsky’s criticism.
RUBENFELD, supra note 53, at 17.
Professor Rubenfeld admits that there is “[n]o a priori necessity dictat[ing] the existence of
any specific, core, actuating, applications for the various rights and powers included in the
American Constitution.” Id. at 119. In his judgment, however, “it just so happens that there
were [such actuating applications] for just about every one of the Constitution’s most
important rights and powers,” id., so the point is largely theoretical. In the case of a
provision with no paradigm case, the constitutional interpreter would simply be left with
applying whatever “principle or proposition [is] set forth in the text” itself. Id. at 134.
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that there can be bad-faith, manipulative arguments as well, which the method
itself cannot distinguish on their face from intellectually honest ones.
This last, third point can be easily dealt with—as alluded to above,
Revolution by Judiciary assumes from start to finish that the constitutional
interpreter it is addressing acknowledges that her “first duty” as an interpreter
is “to abide by the Constitution [and] to deliver a just reading of that
document according to interpretive criteria.”79 The scientific method doesn’t
stop researchers from falsifying their results, but it would be silly to reject the
method for that reason. In just the same way it is not an interesting criticism of
the interpretive criteria Rubenfeld proposes that the criteria do not in
themselves prevent an unscrupulous judge from manipulating them.
The second criticism, that in some instances we may not be able to find, or
at least to agree on, a paradigmatic Application Understanding for a given
provision is, I think, more serious, but only modestly so. As Rubenfeld
implies,80 there is in fact a lot of historical information about the perceived
original purposes of most important constitutional provisions likely to come
into controversy. Recall that a Rubenfeldian interpreter is interested only in
specific Application Understandings, when they exist, and not in the broader
question of what a provision’s original meaning in general was. This
significantly reduces the difficulty of making (in an intellectually responsible
manner) the historical assertions necessary to paradigm-case reasoning as
compared to those required by a strict originalism: It is easier to conclude that
the one thing the Fourteenth Amendment was unquestionably meant to do was
to outlaw the black codes than it is to determine who is right about other,
broader issues of original meaning. And—from my perspective if not (to the
same extent, anyway) from Professor Rubenfeld’s—it causes no theoretical
discomfort to admit that in the absence of a persuasive argument about what a
provision’s paradigm case is, the provision simply doesn’t apply beyond
whatever force can be given to its words.
Finally, our critic’s first worry over the indeterminacy left in place by
Rubenfeld’s account of constitutional law is, I think, ultimately
indistinguishable from worry over indeterminacy in the law generally. It is
true, without any doubt, that at any given point in time there are a great many
constitutional issues about which reasonable, good-faith interpreters can reach
opposite conclusions, from identifying what the paradigm cases are and what
principles they embody to determining how they apply to resolve
contemporary disputes about very different issues. It is equally true, however,

79.
80.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 119.
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that not all arguments are equally plausible, and that the very heart of AngloAmerican law rests in making contestable judgments about which arguments
are better and which worse whenever one happens to be arguing. It is a
strength, not a weakness, of Rubenfeld’s book that he avoids any suggestion
that his own arguments, using what he believes to be the implicit logic of
constitutional law, are invulnerable to contrary arguments that use the same
logic more persuasively. What he has identified for us is the way in which we
have made and should make arguments to one another in the shared task of
interpreting the Constitution. We should not expect greater precision in
executing our practices than the subject matter will allow.
E. Why Is Constitutional Law Binding? An Unnecessary Answer
In my judgment, then, Revolution by Judiciary is a tremendous contribution
to our understanding of federal constitutional law. Professor Rubenfeld has
identified a pattern in the almost infinitely complex and ever-changing
substance of constitutional law that rescues the field from the charges of
unintelligibility or sheer political choice. He has, furthermore, suggested what
I believe to be an entirely satisfactory rationale of why judges should follow the
traditional interpretive practices of our legal culture in making constitutional
decisions: Those practices define what constitutional law is,81 and those who
have undertaken as judges (or others) the obligation to make decisions
according to constitutional law have a duty to act accordingly. Consider his
2002 comment on Judge Posner’s denial that a judge has “some kind of moral
or even political duty to abide by constitutional or statutory text, or by
precedent”82:
Unless Posner intends a distinction between abiding by the
Constitution and abiding by “constitutional text” (and I don’t think he
intends this distinction), Posner’s statement could be said to amount to
an express repudiation of his oath of office. In fact, Posner’s view seems
to make the oath a kind of lark. The whole point of an oath is to create a
moral or political duty.83
No more is needed, I think, to explain the normative force for a
constitutional judge of a correct account of constitutional decisionmaking: She
is under a moral and political duty stemming from her acceptance of her public

81.
82.
83.

See id. at 132-34.
Posner, supra note 59, at 739.
Rubenfeld, supra note 59, at 767.
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office. The same is true of other citizens—legislators, executive officers,
jurors—acting in public capacities. In defining for us what constitutional law
is, Rubenfeld has suggested to us the reason why constitutional law has
normative force.
A bit ironically, one person who would certainly dissent from my
confidence in the persuasiveness and the completeness of Professor
Rubenfeld’s argument (as I have restated it) is Rubenfeld himself. For him, an
account of why the law of constitutional law binds judges must go deeper, to
wrestle with and solve what he calls “the paradox of commitment”—the
philosophical problem generated by the oddity of treating as normative our
past commitments when they conflict with our present preferences.84 Most of
the second section of Revolution by Judiciary builds on Rubenfeld’s earlier work
employing philosophy and game theory to address the relationship between
constitutional law and democracy. Rubenfeld’s work in this has led him for
years to critique “presentist” understandings of democracy and to insist that
self-government (whether an individual’s or a society’s) requires the making
and maintenance of commitments over time.85 My sense is that Rubenfeld’s
current formulation has achieved new levels of clarity and conceptual power.
And, in this context, I think, the philosophical work is unnecessary and
distracting. Professor Rubenfeld forthrightly admits, at the beginning of the
second section, that he is simply assuming “without ever proving, that what is
true of individual commitments is true, mutatis mutandis, of constitutional
commitments—that political self-government may be profitably understood by
analogy to individual self-government.”86 Precisely: The theory of selfgovernment set out in this book rests on a highly contestable analogy between
the moral identity of individuals and the nature of a democratic and
constitutional state. Many of his readers, myself included, will not find the
analogy persuasive, and for us the attempt to ground constitutional law in the
theory therefore fails to get off the ground. I think that Rubenfeld’s analysis of
the role of temporally extended commitments in our individual moral lives is
potentially a major contribution to philosophical ethics, and I hope that he
pursues this work further, unshackled by a felt need to relate the analysis to
constitutional law. But he should also free his powerful and persuasive account
of constitutional law from the link to a novel, highly contestable philosophical

84.
85.

86.

See RUBENFELD, supra note 53, at 71-79.
It would be impossible to summarize Professor Rubenfeld’s elegant argument in a footnote,
and I will not try. But see id. at 88 (summarizing the solution to the paradox of commitment
as lying in the necessity of being able to make and keep commitments to “self-government
over time” if an individual or society is to enjoy autonomy).
Id. at 72.
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theory. The law doesn’t need the theory any more than the theory benefits
from being forced to accommodate the law.
Professor Rubenfeld, I can imagine, might respond that there is a serious
problem with my suggestion that he disconnect his legal theory from his
philosophical one. With respect to judges and others with public duties they
have voluntarily undertaken, he might concede that one can point to those
voluntary undertakings as the basis for holding that they have a moral and
political duty to act in accordance with the norms defining the practice of
constitutional decisionmaking, but such reasoning does not address the duties,
or lack thereof, of the vast majority of Americans, the vast majority of the time.
Most of the time, most of us have undertaken no public duty and exercise no
public office. What gives the Constitution normative force for us? Why should
we, for example, obey constitutional laws enacted by Congress? These are
profound questions, but they are (let it be noted) simply a peculiarly American
twist on the great problem of political obligation, which goes back to Socrates
if not before in the Western tradition alone. Many conflicting answers have
been proposed, and American society has never had—and doubtless never will
reach—a consensus on what the American answer is, or rather what it ought to
be. That is, furthermore, a good thing: I think (and I believe Professor
Rubenfeld thinks) that one of the most attractive features of American
constitutionalism is the absence of prescriptions about “what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”87 The question
of what, if any, moral obligations we owe the Republic simply because we find
ourselves within its jurisdiction and subject as a practical matter to the exercise
of power by its public officials, is not, in the end, a matter of constitutional law
at all,88 and in turn constitutional law does not depend on or need a
philosophical foundation. Like the Republic it structures, the practice of
constitutional law is a political reality based not in theory but in history.89 By
rethinking and clarifying Rubenfeld’s account of paradigm-case reasoning,

87.
88.

89.

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
There is perhaps an exception: The Thirteenth Amendment purports—or so it has been
interpreted by the Court, along with the right to travel interstate—to apply to private as well
as governmental action, and one might expect then that private citizens would stand in the
same position with respect to the enforcement of the Amendment that public officials stand
with respect to all constitutional commands. As an empirical matter, however, I think most
Americans would accept, from their varying moral perspectives, the existence of a moral
prohibition on enslaving someone else, so the difficulty seems hypothetical.
“American constitutional law begins with specific commitments, sometimes written in
blood. This is not a matter of a priori or conceptual necessity; it is a matter of history.”
RUBENFELD, supra note 53, at 134.
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Revolution by Judiciary makes a signal and highly welcome contribution to our
understanding of the law of the Constitution.
conclusion
America’s Constitution and Revolution by Judiciary are very different books,
but they share a robust confidence in the possibility of writing constitutional
law in a grand manner even in an era in which almost everything in the field is
“passionately contested, with little common ground from which to build
agreement.”90 The books are marked by some strong similarities as well as
striking differences. Both books rest on an almost medieval “realism” in talking
about “We the People” that is startling to those of us of a nominalistic mindset;
the reader of this Commentary will have gathered by now that I think both
books are marred by misidentifying (as I see it) the language of American
political discourse with a reality external to that language. Furthermore, and
positively, both books take seriously the role of original understandings in
American constitutionalism in ways that transcend the tired old originalism
battles of the late twentieth century. Where the two books most sharply
diverge is that Revolution by Judiciary has as its ultimate focus the actual practice
of constitutional law, while America’s Constitution is concerned with unveiling a
set of textual meanings that are not finally rooted in history or law.
Perhaps most importantly, however, both these books suggest that the
right response to the existing discord in constitutional law and scholarship is
not to retreat to small-scale projects, but to seek with renewed zeal a grand
vision of constitutional meaning. Professor Amar and Professor Rubenfeld
have shown real moral courage in going out on Professor Tribe’s limb to offer
us broad-ranging attempts to speak about the whole of their respective,
somewhat different, subjects. I have suggested some criticisms of each book
out of the conviction that we honor a scholar when we take his or her work
seriously enough to disagree.
H. Jefferson Powell is Professor of Law, Duke University. He is grateful to Erwin
Chemerinsky and Jed Purdy for very helpful conversations on his thoughts on the
books under consideration.

90.

Tribe, supra note 1, at 292.
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